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Abstract:  
 
We are pleased to present this Special Issue on Family Governance in the Journal of Family 
Business Management. The focus of the six articles in this Special Issue is on family governance, 
idiosyncratic family firm behavior, strategies, and performance. This Guest Editor’s note 
synthesizes the contributing authors’ propositions and findings concerning family governance 
and provides future research directions. 
 
Many firms around the world exhibit family governance via family ownership, family’s 
involvement in management and/or board, and other forms which can in turn substantially 
influence their strategies, behavior, and performance. When family business members pursue 
particularistic goals and strategies, these reflect on to firm strategies, behavior, and performance. 
For instance, the particularistic pursuit of family-centered non-economic goals create intentions 
to preserve socioemotional wealth (SEW), including family control and influence, binding social 
ties, emotional attachment, family members’ identification with the firm, and renewal of family 
bonds to the firm through dynastic succession (Berrone et al., 2012; Carney, 2005). The 
achievement of non-economic goals is contingent upon the family’s control of the firm through 
family governance mechanisms (Chrisman et al., 2014). Hence, when SEW is coupled with 
family governance components such as family ownership, they are influential on firm strategies, 
behavior, and performance. Accordingly, some of the articles in the Special Issue suggest and 
show that the family governance driven by SEW preservation concerns shape strategic behaviors 
such as innovation and different types of innovators (i.e. limited, intended, potential, and active) 
(Li and Daspit, 2016) and unique family controlled Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS) 
driven by SEW perform differently depending on CEO founder vs successor in charge (Chang 
and Noguera, 2016). 
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Article: 
 
Introduction 
 
We are pleased to present this Special Issue on Family Governance in the Journal of Family 
Business Management. The focus of the six articles in this Special Issue is on family governance, 
idiosyncratic family firm behavior, strategies, and performance. This Guest Editor’s note 
synthesizes the contributing authors’ propositions and findings concerning family governance 
and provides future research directions. 
 
Many firms around the world exhibit family governance via family ownership, family’s 
involvement in management and/or board, and other forms which can in turn substantially 
influence their strategies, behavior, and performance. When family business members pursue 
particularistic goals and strategies, these reflect on to firm strategies, behavior, and performance. 
For instance, the particularistic pursuit of family-centered non-economic goals create intentions 
to preserve socioemotional wealth (SEW), including family control and influence, binding social 
ties, emotional attachment, family members’ identification with the firm, and renewal of family 
bonds to the firm through dynastic succession (Berrone et al., 2012; Carney, 2005). The 
achievement of non-economic goals is contingent upon the family’s control of the firm through 
family governance mechanisms (Chrisman et al., 2014). Hence, when SEW is coupled with 
family governance components such as family ownership, they are influential on firm strategies, 
behavior, and performance. Accordingly, some of the articles in the Special Issue suggest and 
show that the family governance driven by SEW preservation concerns shape strategic behaviors 
such as innovation and different types of innovators (i.e. limited, intended, potential, and active) 
(Li and Daspit, 2016) and unique family controlled Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS) 
driven by SEW perform differently depending on CEO founder vs successor in charge (Chang 
and Noguera, 2016). 
 
To explain the extent of a family’s influence on family firms, Klein et al. (2005) identify family 
influence dimensions: power, experience, and culture. According to Chrisman et al. (2005), the 
power dimension involves sources and amount of authority a family has in a family firm. 
Experience dimension describes the level and type of family involvement in a family business 
and the extent to which this involvement lasts through generations. Culture is composed of 
family members’ values and the extent to which these values shape the organizational values in 
family firms. Chrisman et al. (2005, p. 244) suggest that these three dimensions indicate "a 
family’s ability and willingness to influence the direction of a business, as well as the depth to 
which a family’s influence is likely to have affected business decision making." In the Special 
Issue, Sanchez-Marin et al. (2016) demonstrate that these family influence dimensions have 
differential impact on tax aggressiveness tendencies in family firms. 
 
Moreover, although family firms are the dominant form of enterprise organization and key 
drivers of economies around the world (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; La Porta et al., 1999; Tagiuri 
and Davis, 1996; Zahra and Sharma, 2004), we know little about how family governance 
influences their capital structure as well as the allocation of funds. Cho et al. (2016) examine the 
link between family ownership and debt ratios and moderation effects of equity performance and 
family control through involvement in management on this link. While Cho et al. examine the 
sources of funds, Muntean’s (2016) work extends this line of research by investigating the 
allocation of funds, such as founder – and family controlled firms’ political campaign support 
and contributions. 
 
The focus on the impact of different forms of family governance on family firm strategies, 
behavior, and performance by drawing upon different theoretical perspectives contributes to the 
advancement of the theory of the family firm. This Guest Editor’s note provides such a 
discussion of key findings and presents directions for future theory building and testing. 
 
The remainder of the Guest Editor’s note will progress as follows: first, this Editor’s note will 
summarize each article in the Special Issue and evaluate key propositions and findings and their 
theoretical and practical implications. This allows identification of several under-researched 
areas that require close scholarly attention. In the final section of the Guest Editor’s note, 
promising future research directions and insights for practitioners are discussed. 
 
Articles 
 
Family firm innovation heterogeneity 
 
Li and Daspit (2016) draw attention to mixed findings concerning innovation in family and 
suggest that both the degree of family involvement in governance and the family’s SEW 
intention affect the extent to which innovation is pursued. The authors develop a typology to 
classify the configurations of family firm innovation and identify four types of emergent 
innovation strategies as limited innovator, intended innovator, potential innovator, and active 
innovator strategies based on risk orientation, innovation goal, and knowledge diversity. The 
authors also provide practically useful recommendations regarding transitions from limited, 
intended, and potential innovators to active innovators. 
 
Family controlled REITS 
 
By drawing upon Transaction Cost Theory and SEW perspective, Chang and Noguera (2016) 
examine the governance mechanisms of family controlled REITS and compare them with those 
of professionally managed REITs. The authors suggest that controlling families are driven by 
SEW preservation rather than conforming to institutional norms. In turn, such actions result in 
performance variations and entrenchment. On the one hand, findings show that family controlled 
REITs focus more on developing governance mechanisms for SEW preservation despite the 
external governance controls prevailing in the markets. On the other hand, professional REITs 
tend to focus more on following institutional norms. Additionally, the authors show that long-
term REIT performance is negatively affected when the CEO founder retires. When the 
successor is related to the founder long-term REIT, performance is negatively affected at a 
greater extent than when the successor is a professional manager. The authors also provide 
implications for practice. 
 
Tax aggressiveness 
 
Sanchez-Marin et al. (2016) examine the tax aggressiveness (i.e. firm’s activities geared toward 
structuring and rationalizing the tax burden by evaluating all the potential benefits in relation to 
the explicit and implicit costs) of family SMEs based on the family influence dimensions (i.e. 
power, experience, and culture) (F-PEC) developed by Astrachan et al. (2002). Specifically, the 
authors suggest that family influence dimensions differentially affect the tax aggressiveness of 
family firms. Findings reveal that higher levels of family experience by the incorporation of 
second and subsequent generations increases tax aggressiveness, whereas higher levels of family 
power through family ownership and management lowers tax aggressiveness. Interestingly, a 
greater alignment of family and business culture does not exert a significant effect on tax 
behaviors of family firms. 
 
Capital structure 
 
Cho et al. (2016) analyze 200 publicly traded family firms in the S&P Small-Cap 600 index from 
1999 to 2007 and show that family ownership is positively related to market-and book-value debt 
ratios. However, this effect is mitigated by equity performance and family control through the 
CEO position. Thereby, the authors draw attention to the differential impact of family ownership 
and family management on capital structure. 
 
Political behavior in founder – and family controlled firms 
 
Muntean (2016) enlightens us regarding the political behavior of founders, families, and their 
firms in the form of campaign contributions which has not been explored by past family business 
research. Indeed, partisan and ideological campaign contributions raise a range of governance 
issues and implications for myriad stakeholders, including investors, employees, customers, and 
the public. The author compares and contrasts the campaign contributions of founder – and 
family controlled firms relative to managerially governed firms and finds that founder – and 
family controlled firms are more partisan and ideological than other firms in their industry and 
this finding is consistent across industries. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
The unique differences between family and non-family firms prompted family business research 
and the theory of the family firm to develop. As the theory of the family firm emerged and 
advanced, researchers identified differences not only between family and non-family firms, but 
also among family firms themselves. Family involvement in business tends to vary in family 
firms, resulting in variant forms of family governance and, in turn, idiosyncratic family firm 
strategies, behaviors, and performance. For example, family governance through ownership, 
management, and other governance mechanisms can differentially influence firm strategies such 
as innovation and firm performance. Hence, there has been a strong need to study and to learn 
more about these differences among family firms. This Special Issue informs both theory and 
practice through a further investigation of family firms’ heterogeneity by taking a closer look at 
different configurations of family governance and how they influence family firm outcomes by 
drawing upon different theoretical perspectives such as SEW view, transaction cost, equity, and 
organizational justice theories. 
 
There are a number of important contingencies that can alter the relationships examined in this 
Special Issue. Therefore, future research may explore other potential family governance forms 
and configurations along with contingencies such as family size, firm and national culture, 
industry, legal context, generation in charge, and many more in influencing family firm 
outcomes. For instance, even though increased globalization tends to cause similarities in 
business conduct in world economies, different legal regimes (e.g. common vs civil law) in 
different countries can result in differences in family governance and outcomes. Additionally, 
family business owners, managers, and board members often co-exist along with other large 
shareholders such as institutional owners in case of publicly traded family firms (unlike in 
private family firms). Therefore, the various outcomes of different family governance 
configurations can be investigated across countries. Furthermore, other theoretical angles such as 
stakeholder and institutional theories are also applicable to family governance investigations 
while agency theory, RBV, and KBV have been relatively more drawn upon. 
 
This Guest Editors’ note reflects on each article in the Special Issue on family governance 
configurations and their impact on family firm behavior, strategies, and outcomes. The articles in 
this Special Issue focus on unique organizational phenomena such as innovation, capital 
structure, financial performance, tax aggressiveness, and political behavior shaped by different 
forms of family governance. Several under-researched areas concerning family governance are 
identified, and future research directions and implications for practitioners are presented. 
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